kirtihospital.com/day-of-infamy-7-december1941-pearl-harbor.php Shipped Weight: kilos. ISBN: Please contact H4o Books if you require images or further information. Inventory No: London : Harper Collins. Hard Back Dust Cover. More photos available. Crisp clean unclipped illustrated dust-jacket. Navy spine with white lettering. Fresh illustrated covers. Tight binding. Clean pages and end-papers. Quantity Available: 1. Shipped Weight: kg. Pictures of this item not already displayed here available upon request. Harper Collins. Book: Boards with minor shelf wear. Pages unmarked. Binding with no separations.
DJ with shelf wear. Most orders shipped within 24 hours. International customers will be reimbursed a portion of unused shipping charges. Shipping : FREE. Robust recyclable packaging. Helens, Lancashire: The Book People, A collection and analysis of first-hand accounts from World War II veteran aircrew offering a fresh look at the day air war that raged over Europe from A clean, crisp copy in unclipped jacket. Appears unread. Illustrated with b. In the summer of oil installations became the major target. In October through December , the Century Bombers attacked transportation, oil refineries and ground defenses in the drive against the Siegfried Line.
They were involved in the December 24, mission to attack communication centers and airfields in the Ardennes sector during the Battle of the Bulge. January to April , the Group concentrated on marshalling yards, bridges, factories, docks, oil refineries and ground support. This book looks at the history and personalities associated with each base, what remains today and explores the favourite local wartime haunts where aircrew and ground crew would have sought well-deserved entertainment and relaxation.
Other museums and places that are relevant are described and general directions on how to get them included"--Publisher's website. Boeing : a history : delivering the dream by Martin W Bowman 3 editions published in in English and held by WorldCat member libraries worldwide. It is unique in that the story is told using first person accounts from RAF, German and American 'Eagles' who fought in the skies over England in the Battle of Britain in the summer of and the great air offensives over occupied-Europe from onwards.
The first five and a half chapters cover the Battle of Britain period when the RAF squadrons fought dog fights with the Luftwaffe and then fought them in gathering strength using the 'Big Wings to meet the bomber fleets attacking London. The second part of the book covers the Eagle squadron period, which was expanded with America's entry into the war. A whole host of incredible first hand accounts by British, Polish, Czech, German and American fighter pilots permeate the action and describe the aerial battles as only they can.
This unique book also includes many accounts and photos that have not previously been seen before while the rich mix of combat accounts from all sides are brought together for the first time in one volume. Legend of the Lancasters : the bomber war from England by Martin W Bowman 4 editions published in in English and held by WorldCat member libraries worldwide This book is a riveting account told in ten big chapters of the young RAF crews who flew Lancasters in RAF Bomber Command from to the end of the war in Europe in April It is unique in that the story is told using first person accounts from RAF aircrew and German night fighter crews who fought each other on raids on occupied Europe and Germany from onwards.
Details of what it was like to be on the receiving end in Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne etc are also included. A whole host of incredible first-hand accounts by British, Commonwealth, American and German air crews permeate the action and describe the aerial battles as only they can. Air war market garden by Martin W Bowman 3 editions published between and in English and held by WorldCat member libraries worldwide This is the first volume of a most impressive tribute and accurate four part work that uniquely presents a complete account of the air operations throughout 'Market-Garden' in September when British, US and Polish airborne troops made a gallant attempt to seize and hold bridges across the Lower Rhine in Holland as a springboard for crossing into Germany.
In this unprecedented and insightful account, the exploits of the First Allied Airborne Army are relayed in full detail; supplemented with historical notes regarding the ground operations, this is sure to offer an unparalleled account of the events as they unfolded in the skies above Holland. If successful, the war could be over by Christmas. That it did and on such a massive scale is the underlying theme throughout this series. The action was at times very confused, so a narrative of events contained in sixteen timelines at intervals throughout this series cuts through the fog of battle to explain the situation from its over-optimistic beginning to the tragic conclusion.
Bombs away! Their endearing bravery and fortitude and sometimes their despondency and cynicism, shows through in these stirring, daring, often irreverent, humorous and sometimes sardonic but memorable stories. The organisation lacked a sufficient supply of commissioned pilots of fighter forces. This neglect meant a lack of combat leaders later in the war.
Galland himself noted that pilot training for trainees was too limited in flying hours received.
Too little training was received on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, combat training, and there was a complete lack of instrument training. Galland asserted that the lack of instrument training had not been corrected until late in the war. Staff training was uneven and neglected.
Systematic training of formation leaders was not begun until after It created a lack of trained and experienced flight leaders in — This was far too late to help in the Defence of the Reich campaign. The high turnover in the division made gaining experience impossible. Making matters worse, there were no fighter command organisations at the start of the war and there were never enough good officers to staff those that were set up. The Luftwaffe had very few General Staff Officers. Most Luftwaffe leaders were born well before the First World War and the army preferred officer candidates from the Real Gymnasien high school, that emphasized sciences and modern languages.
However, because of the social and political situation, they looked for candidates from the Humanistische Gymnasien , a high school enrolled with sons of families of the higher classes, of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy, and which stood against the egalitarian and democratic ideas of the lower, more technical-minded worker and craftsmen. The Humanistische Gymnasien produced graduates with a classical and all-round education, that was less focused on specialisation and technology. However, many of those graduates from the Humanistische Gymnasien eventually became famous scientists.
About 5 percent of Luftwaffe generals and general staff officers obtained technical degrees during their academic training. Most of these officiers could not familiarise themselves with higher technology, because Germany was not allowed to have aircraft and heavy weapons during the time of the Weimar Republic. The Luftwaffe ' s key mistakes meant that the Jagdwaffe was overloaded with missions after At no point the Jagdwaffe was allowed to take the offensive to try to regain air superiorty, and tactics were always defensive or reactive.
The successive draining of resources from the Defence of the Reich to the Eastern Front went on for too long which hampered an early build-up of RLV forces. It was slow and piecemeal and lacked any formal planning. The OKL damaged the fighting efficiency of fighter groups by transferring them away from their Geschwader command. The ground organization and communications networks were neglected when moving units causing confusion and reducing operational readiness. Bad weather operations completely overtaxed fighter units and inflicted high losses which caused a drop in morale and confidence in the High Command.
All raids were met at full strength, rapidly wearing down the defenders. Giving control of IX. Fliegerkorps to the bomber arm had a disastrous impact. They were not qualified to conduct offensive operations and to lead fighter formations. Dissolution and heavy losses were the results.
During the course of the conflict, the OKL never understood the importance of time, the need to rest, plan and recover to prolong defensive operations. Continuously keeping units on the frontline needlessly wore them out.
Another contributory factor was the lack of attention paid to Adolf Galland 's basic rules of combat. In the tactical battle, he argued that the fighter must fight on the offensive, even when on defensive missions. There was no place for a defensive posture. Combat cohesiveness was frequently disregarded, and the integrity of the formations became compromised and ignored owing to a lack of experienced leaders. Fixed tactical scheme contributed to failures as well.
Rigid tactics were allowed to take root, and technique suffered. Using surprise, cunning and manoeuvrability had to be combined with aggressiveness and improvisation depending on the situation. This sort of tactical advantage was lost over time. German aircraft production difficulties in equipping and expanding the air force arose since the mobilization in Production in the 5 years of rearmament for more combat aircraft began to rise sharply in the plans for a long-term air-force expansion, while the general aircraft production output worsened faster and by a greater margin.
During the period from to actual aircraft production plans remained unchanged or went into reverse. After the Wehrmacht's failure at the Battle of Moscow , industrial priorities for increasing aircraft production were largely abandoned to support the army's increased attrition rates and heavy equipment losses.
In , an average of aircraft including fighters were produced monthly. He pointed out that these supplies could have built 1, Dornier Do heavy bombers and 4, Messerschmitt Bf s. He ordered metals to be recycled, and metals from crashed aircraft to be used again. Hans Jeschonnek initially opposed Milch's planned production increases. But in June, he changed his mind and suggested fighters per month should be the average output.
The intensification of Allied bombing caused Germany to disperse production and prevented an efficient acceleration of Milch's expansion program. German aviation production reached about 36, aircraft in However, by the time this was achieved the Luftwaffe lacked the fuel and trained pilots to make this achievement worthwhile. Despite the tactical victories won, they failed to achieve a decisive victory.
By the time production reached acceptable levels, it was too little too late. RAF strategists deemed the attacks on large areas of industrial cities were the best that could be achieved due to a lack of accuracy in bombing technology. Despite this ambitious strategy, the RAF had entered the Second World War without a bomber fleet that was fit for the purpose of large-scale strategic bombing.
All unescorted bombers were vulnerable in daylight to fighter aircraft. The longest defensive air campaign of the Second World War began on the afternoon of 4 September , just one day after Britain 's declaration of war on Germany. These raids continued into December The German units involved, claimed 38 Wellingtons for a loss of only three German fighters, and the British, claimed 12 German fighters destroyed and another dozen severely damaged.
British strategists argued over the nature of British strategy in the — period, the essence of which formed the fundamental base of RAF strategy throughout the war. Bombing results were also wrangled over and formed the key to the issue. Some in the Air Ministry argued that the bombing technology was not accurate and as a result of this precision attacks could not be undertaken. Kammhuber recruited pilots Hermann Diehl and Wolfgang Falck to his command.
They were important figures in developing the night fighter system. Diehl had helped develop radar controlled defences for daylight operations which were used at the Battle of the Heliogoland Bight in December Although not successful at first, results soon improved. It was halted around October , as a lack of long-range radar made it an unsuitable method. It proved difficult to implement owing to production delays with the Freya.
Kammhuber began to realise the potential of airborne radar at this time. After consulting Wolfgang Martini , a technical specialist in the Luftwaffe , the development of Lichtenstein radar began. Despite the Germans having only a fledgling defence, most of Bomber Command's operations against Germany in — failed. In the second half of RAF bombers failed to return.
Only 72 of these were due to growing German competence in night fighting; 42 were claimed by the Luftwaffe and 30 by AAA units. The rest simply ran out of fuel. Most of these cases were caused by poor navigation training in the pre-war era. One notable tactic was Kammhuber's offensive action.
In keeping with the Luftwaffe ' s defence by offensive action over enemy territory, Kammhuber suggested tracking bombers and attacking them as they took off from their bases in Britain. Hitler refused on the grounds that the German people needed to see the British bombers being brought down over Germany so as to be convinced they were being defended. After October , the Luftwaffe stopped their mini offensive. In — these intruders had been responsible for two-thirds of the RAF losses. The chance to wreak havoc on the bomber offensive was lost.
The difficulties of the Luftwaffe to protect Berlin from a series of small-scale raids made by RAF Bomber Command during the Battle of Britain led to the construction of a solid air defence programmes. Luftflotte Reich was eventually produced, which protected all of Germany and Central Europe. Until Luftflotte 3 was effectively destroyed in the Normandy Campaign in August , the home defence forces remained split between rival commanders.
The German attitude to air defence was built on the 'counterair' action. Air superiority would be attained and won over enemy airspace, safeguarding the homeland from attack. Despite this, many of the ingredients for an improvised defence were on hand or under development in The Germans possessed large numbers of AAA batteries, of good quality and varying calibers supported by searchlights, sound detectors and visual ranging apparatus. They were also deploying Freya radar on the coastlines supported by observer networks.
The Luftwaffe supported its defences with its main dayfighter, the Messerschmitt Bf while it had no night fighters. There was also no centralised control system and air units were not directed closely from the ground, as was the case with RAF Fighter Command. When Bomber Command began attacks by night in May , the Germans had no adequate means of intercepting incoming formations of RAF bombers. Pre-war trials aimed at creating a night fighter defence had used a warning service based on sound detectors and searchlights. Night fighters orbited the beacons at altitude outside illuminated area, and when a bomber was caught in the light, the fighter engaged the aircraft.
Any focusing of searchlights at altitude signaled the night fighter to enter the illuminated zone and attack. AAA units were ordered to fire at every given opportunity, other than when the fighters were in the combat zone. These experiments ceased in August and in were still reliant on searchlight-aided AAA with fighters in a subordinate role.
In response to Bomber Command's offensive in , Josef Kammhuber was asked to develop a more effective night defence. Over the next three years he developed a sophisticated defence known to the British as the Kammhuber Line. Kammhuber began by expanding the illuminated zone to extend from occupied Denmark to northern France. Early warning relied on Freya radar, sound detection devices and observers.
The next requirement was a capable night fighter, which the Germans did not have; however, they improvised and used the Messerschmitt Bf heavy fighter and Junkers Ju 88 medium bomber. Both these types proved exceptional in the role. With an operational system now online, tactical considerations were developed. The first was airborne radar sets, installed on fighters. German pilots complained about this as it created drag and reduced the performance of their aircraft. They preferred to acquire the target visually once ground control had guided them onto the bomber stream.
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A second change involved the removal of AAA installations and searchlights from the line and grouping them around cities for their defence. The system had some weaknesses. The line was composed of a series of contiguous boxes. The awkwardness of the plotting system used within each box prior to and the absence of an air-mounted IFF Identification Friend or Foe , meant that only one fighter at a time could be controlled from the ground.
The two plots were not represented on a single radarscope; they came from two different individual operators, each of whom projected a different coloured circle on a plotting table. The controller radioed directions to the fighter on the basis of data provided by the plotting table. Until IFF became available, blips could not be identified. When operators lost fighters, which often happened, they had to return to the beacon in that particular box. Compounding command, control and communication problems, a failure to intercept usually resulted.
Airborne radar solved this problem. Initially, the UHF -band Lichtenstein BC radar set, the first such radar unit used by the Luftwaffe , had a narrow search angle and when a bomber employed radical evasive manoeuvres, contact could be lost. Despite its weaknesses, growing sophistication and better organisation, the Kammhuber Line became a formidable obstacle.
The entry of the United States U. For the first year, the expected all-out offensive against German targets did not come. In the North Africa campaign , the Luftwaffe was losing air superiority , the RAF was increasing its fighter sweeps over France , and its night bombing campaign of German cities was starting to increase in intensity.
Despite this the defence of German air space was given low priority as the Reich expanded on all fronts.
He noted that if enemy bomber formations started penetrating the German fighter defence at the Channel coast, there was "nothing left in Germany to oppose them". The American command did not see the need for long-range fighters in , and like Bomber Command in the early war period, believed the bomber would always get through. On that understanding, there was no rush to develop fighter aircraft of this type. The twin-engined mid-range Lockheed P Lightning had been designed as a high-altitude interceptor and was adequate in the escort role. As an interim solution the Americans were given the British Spitfire , but it lacked the range to reach beyond the coastal areas of western Europe.
American strategic policy differed from that of the RAF. According to American intelligence, by late the German Wehrmacht and its supporting industry was already stretched thin and suggested that certain targets would be particularly sensitive to attack. As a result, oil and petroleum and synthetic rubber were added to the American " Air War Plan 42 ". The American agenda, sent up in June planned a strike at the German air industry, which was considered a prerequisite to any aerial and or land offensives on the continent. Its aim was to defeat the Luftwaffe in the air, on the ground and to destroy its aviation industry to a degree that it could no longer pose a threat to an Allied invasion of the continent.
Eaker had proposed a combined offensive for this operation, named Operation Pointblank. Its plan was based upon selection, or precision attack by USAAF forces in daylight, supported by the area bombing methods of Bomber Command at night. In theory, the British bomber attack assumed a precision ability, but nothing had been done to ensure such practice. Instead, Harris favoured area bombing against industrial cities. It was not until the introduction of a long-range fighter that could escort bombers deep into Germany and back, that a daylight strategy became possible.
This was a poor state of affairs considering German intelligence sources in Washington , prior to hostilities, had picked up minutely detailed reports on the performance and potential performance of American aircraft. He wrote to General Friedrich von Boetticher:. Boetticher, we are lost. We no longer have the air defence I requested and which is needed Then we will be covered from the air with an enemy screen which will paralyze our power to resist.
Jeschonnek lacked the personality to force the reality of the situation onto his superiors. In the end, unable to assert himself, official optimism won the day. The Luftwaffe ' s technical edge was slipping away. However, they explained at a meeting of the Reich Industrial Council on 18 September that the new next generation aircraft had failed to materialise, and that obsolescent types such as the Heinkel He bomber and Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber had to be continued to keep up with the growing need for replacements.
We are simply faced with the question of whether we are to have no aircraft at all in or are to have large numbers of aircraft types which hitherto have proved adequate. For this reason I have recommended to the Reichsmarschall that in —43 we should construct the tried and tested types in large numbers. In , the Fw A series fighter began to partially replace the Bf as the main Luftwaffe fighter type. The Bf variants could fight well at high altitudes and were a match for Allied fighters in performance.
They were to be used primarily as bomber destroyers while the Bf , the better of the two at high altitude, would engage any escorting fighters. The American build up in the ETO was slow. Over a year had passed since Adolf Hitler's declaration of war on the U. Their first raid on Germany targeted Wilhelmshaven on 27 January The German air defences at this time consisted of the Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte , protecting the Netherlands and Germany.
Luftflotte 3 protected Belgium and France. The Luftwaffe leadership continued to press for the production of bombers; little attention was paid to new types of fighters. He claimed that the Bf was nearing the end of its useful service life and there was no replacement on the horizon.
The air battles of and were fought mostly by the old types that had first flown in the mids: the Bf , the Messerschmitt Bf and Ju 88, along with the early-war origin Fw The efficiency and performance of the German fighter arm reached its peak during The German fighters were becoming more heavily armed to deal with the American "heavies": the USAAF's adoption of the combat box formations placed a score or more of bombers together for mutual defense, with dozens of heavy. Some German fighters were fitted with heavy armament upgrades which were devastating to USAAF bombers' like the even larger calibre Bordkanone series of overmm calibre autoloading guns as just one way to attack from beyond the range of massed Brownings in the American bombers.
When successful, these "stand-off" weapon systems could cause high loss rates to bomber streams. The Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission on 17 August despite causing serious damage to the aircraft factories resulted in 36 of Bs attacking Schweinfurt being shot down with the loss of men; against Regensburg , 60 Bs were lost that day. Luftwaffe losses stood at around 27 fighters. Of the attacking Fortresses, 77 Bs were lost and around bombers were damaged. The German losses amounted to 38 fighters.
Raids had an enormous effect on the German distribution of weaponry.
In , heavy anti-aircraft gun batteries and light batteries were protecting German industrial targets. By , the size of the anti-aircraft arm had increased to 2, heavy batteries and 1, light batteries. During November and December , an averaged 4, rounds of heavy ammunition and 6, rounds of light ammunition per aircraft shootdown.
Over the entire course of the war, an averaged 3, rounds of heavy and 4, rounds of light anti-aircraft were needed to shoot down an Allied bomber. Instead of 11 aircraft per thousand, 37 aircraft would have been lost. However, even with the advance of a proximity fuse, no change in the outcome of the homeland air defence could be achieved.
The cost of an individual anti-aircraft kill can be examined when placed in relation to the production cost of the aircraft that were intended to be destroyed. However, unit production costs for the medium bombers do not include expenditures for maintenance, ordnance, and fuel, or the costs associated with the training of the bomber aircrews.
Yet, attrition was having an impact on production. Production in July amounted to 1,; by December, it had fallen to The reduction was due to American efforts against aircraft factories. In October , German intelligence reported Allied fighter aircraft were reaching as far east as Hamburg. The P and Ps were fitted with drop tanks to extend their range. Some reached and crashed near Aachen on Germany's west border. He asserted that the fighters must have been damaged and glided eastward from a great height. The danger was ignored. From mid-October until mid-February , when the Big Week Allied bomber offensive was launched, the Luftwaffe had won air superiority over Germany.
It was also clear to the USAAF that air superiority could not be regained until sufficient numbers of long-range escort fighters became available. The 8AF made no more deep penetrations in clear weather into Germany for the rest of the year. That failure was, prior to December, the result of a command decision based on the lack of escort fighters, and the need for recuperating the bomber force after its losses on 14 October.
Bomber Command had a few successes during this time. Introduction of new navigation aids such as Oboe allowed for accurate bombing. The bombing of Cologne in May , the five-month-long Battle of the Ruhr and bombing of Hamburg were very successful. Hitler and Speer were forced to cut planned increases in production and the disruption caused the Zulieferungskrise sub-components crisis. The increase of aircraft production for the Luftwaffe also came to an abrupt halt.
Monthly production failed to increase between July and March Tiger tank production at the main plant of Henschel was halted for months  and 88 mm artillery production was halted for four months. Production of shell fuses was also stopped; some , had been produced prior from September — March For the time being, "Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks". Some bombers were lost. The attack on Hamburg in July was made beyond Oboe range, the RAF bombers instead relying on the first operational use of H2S radar but the introduction of Window confused German radar defences, only 12 aircraft failed to return and 31 were damaged on the first night.
Some of the bomber crews hit within three marker point. Other losses included industrial concerns and armaments works, of which were important enough to be listed by name, were either destroyed or damaged.